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THE INCREASING
IRRELEVANCE OF
SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER
Christopher D. Bredt
Adam M. Dodek*

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the topic of judicial deference to legislative choices under
section 1 of the Charter. More specifically, it asks, in what circumstances will the
Supreme Court of Canada accord such deference and has the standard of
justification under section 1 become diluted? We begin by examining how the
Supreme Court of Canada has treated the Oakes1 test in the 15 years that have
elapsed since its adoption in 1986. We then identify three different themes that
have emerged from the Supreme Court‟s application of section 1 over this time.
These themes are: first, that section 1 has been marginalized through the
development of internal balancing tests in the definition of many of the substantive
rights protected by the Charter — these internal tests consider factors that are very
similar to those considered in a section 1 inquiry; second, that the original
universality of the Oakes test has given way to context or right-specific
adjudication whereby section 1 seems to be applied on an ad hoc basis; and third,
that in recent years the Supreme Court of Canada has severely weakened the
evidentiary requirement needed to justify an infringement of a right under
section 1. We conclude by suggesting that the Oakes test be abandoned as a
universal standard of justification, and that instead, a rights-specific approach be
developed.

________________________________________________________________________________
* Christopher D. Bredt is a partner and Adam M. Dodek is an associate in the Toronto office of
Borden Ladner Gervais LLP. The authors wish to thank Davit Akman, Jamie Cameron and Barbara
Walker-Renshaw for reading an earlier draft of this paper and providing helpful comments. Reproduced
with the permission of the CBA from conference materials published in The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: Twenty Years Later in 2001.
1
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE OAKES TEST
If a canon of Canadian Charter jurisprudence exists, the first entry would be the
Oakes test. It is learned by rote by first-year law students, recited time and again by
lawyers in their factums, and referenced by judges in judgment after judgment. The
Oakes test is so ingrained in our collective constitutional consciousness that we do
not often take the time to consider it.
When the Charter came into effect in 1982,2 it took time for constitutional
challenges to traverse the system. The Supreme Court of Canada did not decide its
first Charter case until 1984.3 Between 1982 and 1986, lower courts struggled with
the application of section 1 which reads, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”4 The Supreme Court of Canada did not address what section 1
required until R. v. Oakes,5 where Chief Justice Dickson articulated the test that
had to be met under section 1:
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or
freedom are designed to serve, must be “of sufficient importance to warrant overriding
a constitutionally protected right or freedom”: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p.
352. The standard must be high in order to ensure that objectives which are trivial or
discordant with the principles integral to a free and democratic society do not gain s. 1
protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be characterized
as sufficiently important.
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party
invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably
justified. This involves “a form of proportionality test”: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
supra, at p. 352. Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on
the circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of
society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my view, three important
components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully
designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or
based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the
objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first
sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question: R. v. Big
________________________________________________________________________________
2
Except for section 15, which did not come into force until 1985.
3
Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 (interpreting section 6 of the
Charter) was released on May 3, 1984. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, was in fact heard
before Skapinker but decided a few months after Skapinker.
4
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
5
Supra, note 1.
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M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p. 352. Third, there must be a proportionality between the
effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom,
and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”.
With respect to the third component, it is clear that the general effect of any
measure impugned under s. 1 will be the infringement of a right or freedom guaranteed
by the Charter; this is the reason why resort to s. 1 is necessary. The inquiry into
effects must, however, go further. A wide range of rights and freedoms are guaranteed
by the Charter, and an almost infinite number of factual situations may arise in respect
of these. Some limits on rights and freedoms protected by the Charter will be more
serious than others in terms of the nature of the right or freedom violated, the extent of
the violation, and the degree to which the measures which impose the limit trench
upon the integral principles of a free and democratic society. Even if an objective is of
sufficient importance, and the first two elements of the proportionality test are
satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a
measure on individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by the purposes it
is intended to serve. The more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more
important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.6

As Dickson C.J.C. acknowledged in Oakes, this was a “stringent standard of
justification.”7
If Oakes were to be taken at face value, courts would accord minimal deference
to legislative choices and many laws would have to be struck down as failing this
“stringent standard of justification.”8 However, the Oakes test soon proved that its
bark was worse than its bite. In the same year that Oakes was decided, Chief
Justice Dickson retreated from its strict language in Edwards Books,9 where the
Supreme Court upheld Ontario‟s Sunday closing law. In examining the minimal
impairment prong of the Oakes test, Dickson C.J.C. stated that the appropriate
inquiry was whether the law impaired the right “as little as is reasonably
possible.”10 This was a noticeable addition to the language of Oakes, which
required that the right be impaired “as little as possible.”11 Edwards Books marked
the beginning of the Supreme Court of Canada‟s softening of the minimal
impairment part of the Oakes test. In subsequent cases, instead of demanding that

________________________________________________________________________________
6
Id., at 138-39.
7
Id., at 136.
8
On this generally, see Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1995).
9
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
10
Id., at 772.
11
Oakes, supra, note 1, at 139.
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the legislature choose the least restrictive means of achieving its policy objective,
the Court would give the legislature room to manoeuver.12

III. THE INCREASING IRRELEVANCE OF SECTION 1
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court of Canada struggled with the challenge of
applying section 1. Since 1990, it has increasingly reduced the relevance of this
section to the adjudication of Charter rights. As we discuss below, this has resulted
from the development of internal balancing tests at the rights‟ definition stage, the
rejection of the universal application of the Oakes test, and the weakening of
evidentiary requirements under section 1.
1. Balancing of Interests in Defining Rights
The structure of the Charter contemplates a two-stage analysis for the
adjudication of rights. In the first stage, the court determines whether a right has
been infringed. This is largely a definitional stage where the scope of the protected
right is determined. In the second stage, under a section 1 inquiry, the court
determines whether the infringement of that right is justified. This system sets up
an external balancing test where section 1 is used to determine whether the
impugned governmental action is constitutional. Over the last decade, the Supreme
Court has moved towards greater reliance on internal balancing tests. It now
________________________________________________________________________________
12
Professor Hogg termed this flexibility in applying section 1, granting the Legislature “a zone of
discretion.” See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at §35.33. In
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 999, the Court referred to this as “a
margin of appreciation.‟ “Certainly, the cases after Edwards Books have applied the requirement [„margin of
appreciation‟] in a flexible fashion, looking for a reasonable legislative effort to minimize the infringement of
the Charter right, rather than insisting that only the least possible infringement could survive.” Hogg, supra,
at §35.11(b). See, e.g., R. v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (upholding provision of the Criminal Code which
presumes that a person occupying the driver‟s seat has care and control of the car for the purposes of the
offence of drunk driving); Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122
(upholding provision of Criminal Code authorizing court order banning disclosure of the identity of
complainant in sexual assault case); Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 2
S.C.R. 214 (upholding injunction prohibiting striking union from picketing courthouse workplace of some of
its members); United States of America v. Cotroni; United States of America v. El Zein, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
1469 (upholding extradition of a Canadian citizen to the United States); Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c)
of the Criminal Code (Man.) (“Prostitution Reference”), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (upholding the offence of
communicating for the purpose of prostitution); McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229
(upholding mandatory retirement laws); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (upholding Criminal Code
provision on hate propaganda); R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (upholding Criminal Code provision on
pornography); Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876 (upholding provision of
provincial election legislation imposing five-year disqualification on a member of the legislative assembly
who had been found guilty of a corrupt or illegal practice). In each of the above cases, as noted by Hogg,
supra, it is not difficult to conceive of less restrictive means of accomplishing the government‟s objective.
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engages in significant balancing at the definitional stage and only proceeds to a
section 1 inquiry if it finds that the right, balanced against other competing
interests, has been infringed.
The end result of the move from external to internal balancing has been that many
Charter cases rise and fall at the first part of the inquiry and not at the section 1 stage.
Between 1990 and 2000, section 1 was used to uphold impugned governmental
action in only a handful of cases outside of section 2(b).13 The only area where
section 1 use remains significant is in section 2(b) freedom of expression cases.14
Between 1990 and 1999, the Court used section 1 to strike down governmental action
in five out of 25 freedom of expression challenges. In the two most recent section
2(b) cases, the Court used section 1 to uphold the impugned legislation.15
How has the Court moved towards this preference for internal over external
balancing? In some instances, rights protected under the Charter contain language
that lends itself to internal balancing. For example, section 7 provides that
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.”
The text of section 7 itself mandates a two-stage inquiry. The first is whether the
right to life, liberty or security of the person has been deprived and the second is
whether that deprivation is in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. Only after a deprivation has been found not to be in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice would a court proceed to section 1. However,
there is a real question whether government action that has been held to violate
section 7 could ever be justified to under section 1.16 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act
Reference, Lamer J. (as he then was) stated that section 1 could only justify an
infringement of section 7 in exceptional circumstances such as natural disaster, war
or epidemic.17 In the same case, Wilson J. opined that section 1 could never justify
________________________________________________________________________________
13
According to Professor Patrick Monahan, between 1990 and 2000, only 1/33 of section 15
cases turned on the application of section 1. During the same years, only 1/102 section 7 cases turned on
section 1. See Monahan, “The Supreme Court of Canada in 1999: A Year in Review” (1999
Constitutional Cases: An Analysis of the 1999 Constitutional Cases of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 7 April 2000). Our examination of the Charter cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada in 2000 would increase these figures to 1/35 and 1/105 respectively.
14
This is not surprising given the broad interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has
given to section 2(b) and the Court‟s unwillingness to engage in balancing in determining whether
section 2(b) has been infringed. See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
15
See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120, 2000 SCC 69 and R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2. But see the dissenting opinion in
Sharpe which indicated a willingness to consider revisiting the question of the scope of section 2(b).
16
For an excellent discussion of this issue, see the decision of Vertes J. in R. v. Brenton (1999),
180 D.L.R. (4th) 314, at 343-45 (N.W.T.S.C.).
17
Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 518.
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an infringement of section 7.18 Most recently, in United States of America v.
Burns,19 the Supreme Court held that the extradition of two murder suspects
without assurances that they would not face the death penalty violated section 7
and could not be justified under section 1. Similarly, section 8‟s protection against
“unreasonable search and seizure” also lends itself to internal balancing, as does
the right under section 9 not to be “arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.” 20
However, increasingly, it is the proclivity for the use of “contextual factors” in
internal balancing tests that has closed the door on section 1. The Supreme Court‟s
reliance on contextual factors in internal balancing tests is illustrated most
graphically in its recent decisions under section 15 and section 12.
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),21 Mr. Justice
Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court, articulated the principles for analysis
under section 15(1) of the Charter. The Court summarized the test in Law as
follows:
The approach adopted and regularly applied by this Court to the interpretation of
s. 15(1) focuses upon three central issues:
(A)
(B)
(C)

whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others,
in purpose or effect;22
whether one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination are
the basis for the differential treatment;23
whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory
within the meaning of the equality guarantee.24

________________________________________________________________________________
18
Id., at 523.
19
(2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at 56-58, 2001 SCC 7.
20
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that arbitrary detention or imprisonment may be
justified under section 1, at least in the context of random roadside sobriety checks: see R. v. Hufsky,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 621. For other examples of rights that lend themselves to internal balancing consider
also the right under section 11(a) “to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence”;
the right under section 11(b) “to be tried within a reasonable time”; the right under section 11(d) “not to
be denied reasonable bail without just cause.”
21
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. The Court applied the Law test in subsequent decisions: see Corbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3;
Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703; Lovelace v.
Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2000 SCC 37.
22
The Court expressed the first step of the test as follows (at 548):
Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on
the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the
claimant‟s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in
substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or
more personal characteristics?
23
The enumerated grounds under section 15(1) are clear. The Court has provided guidance on
analogous grounds in Corbiere, supra, note 21, at 251-52.
24
Law, supra, note 21, at 548.
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In this third prong of analysis, context becomes important to the Court‟s inquiry.
The Court has identified the purpose of section 15(1) as follows:
In general terms, the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential human
dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or
social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at
law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.
The existence of a conflict between the purpose or effect of an impugned law and the
purpose of s. 15(1) is essential in order to found a discrimination claim. The
determination of whether such a conflict exists is to be made through an analysis of the
full context surrounding the claim and the claimant.25

According to the Court, discrimination is to be determined by an examination of
contextual factors.26 In Law, the Court identified at least four contextual factors
which influence the determination of whether section 15(1) has been infringed.
However, it noted that the list of contextual factors was an open one which could
vary from case to case.27
The complex, contextual and subjective nature of the Court‟s section 15 test
bodes ill for the future of section 1. Essentially, the Law test‟s analysis of a
section 15(1) breach overlaps with the section 1 analysis in a manner that
effectively eviscerates section 1. The Law test now requires a judge to consider the
purpose of the legislation under the initial rights inquiry rather than under the first
stage of the Oakes test. As well, the test articulated by the Court for the
determination of “discrimination” under section 15(1) contains many of the same
elements found in the proportionality part of the section 1 analysis. Finally, the
heavy reliance on “context” in section 15(1) is matched by the Court‟s insistence
on “context” in the application of the section 1 test. The net effect of this overlap is
to strip section 1 of any meaningful role in section 15 jurisprudence.28
A similar phenomenon has occurred in the section 12 jurisprudence. Section 12
prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. As in
section 15‟s Law test, it is hard to envision any meaningful role for section 1 in
________________________________________________________________________________
25
Id., at 549.
26
Id., at 550. The focus of the inquiry is both subjective and objective. The relevant view is that
of the reasonable person, in circumstances similar to those of the claimant, who takes into account the
contextual factors relevant to the claim. See also id., at 534.
27
See id., at 550-51.
28
See Bredt and Nishisato, “The Supreme Court‟s New Equality Test: A Critique” (1999
Constitutional Cases: An Analysis of the 1999 Constitutional Cases of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 7 April 2000).
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section 12 jurisprudence because “In order to properly consider a s. 12 challenge
to a punishment, the court must examine all of the relevant contextual factors.”29 In
so doing, the Court considers many factors which would be relevant to a section 1
inquiry.
A final example of the triumph of internal balancing over section 1 external
balancing can be found in the Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Burns.30 In
Burns, the Supreme Court held that extraditing two murder suspects, without
seeking assurances that they would not be executed, violated their right to life and
liberty under section 7 in a manner that was not in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice. The Court devotes over 60 paragraphs to its discussion of
the principles of fundamental justice whereas the section 1 analysis is contained in
just 10 paragraphs. The Supreme Court expressly recognized its use of an internal
balancing test under the heading, “The Balance of Factors in This Case Renders
Extradition of the Respondents Without Assurances a Prima Facie Infringement of
their Section 7 Rights.”31 The end result is that the section 1 analysis that follows
this extensive internal balancing is short and conclusory. The Court found that
extraditing the murder suspects to face the death penalty without assurances served
a pressing and substantial objective of advancing mutual assistance in the fight
against crime. However, the Court determined that the Minister of Justice failed to
show that extraditing the murder suspects to face the death penalty without
assurances was necessary to achieve that objective.
In short, section 1 has been usurped by the development of internal balancing
tests which rely heavily on context.
2.

The Rejection of Oakes’ Universal Application

Originally, Oakes set one standard of justification that was to apply to all rights
under the Charter. However, in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,
McIntyre J. opined that Oakes was too stringent for application in all cases.32
McIntyre J. rejected the Oakes test completely and applied a different standard of
justification under section 1.33 McIntyre J.‟s reluctance to apply Oakes in all
circumstances has been amplified by the Court in at least two ways: (1) the
contextualization of section 1; and (2) other departures from universality.

________________________________________________________________________________
29
R. v. Morrisey, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at 108, 2000 SCC 39.
30
United States of America v. Burns, supra, note 19.
31
See Heading Number 12 which can be found, id., at 53.
32
See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at 184.
33
Id., at 185.
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(a) The Contextualization of Section 1
While the development of internal balancing tests at the rights-definition stage
stole some of section 1‟s thunder, the Court has also “contextualized” the section 1
analysis. In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),34 Wilson J., writing
for herself, opined that a contextual approach was preferable under section 1. She
contrasted the contextual approach with the abstract approach to determining the
underlying value sought to be protected by a right. Wilson J. promoted the virtue
of the contextual approach as recognizing that a particular right or freedom may
have a different value depending on the context:
The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the aspect of the right or
freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the relevant aspects of any values
in competition with it. It seems to be more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma
posed by the particular facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just
compromise between the two competing values under s. 1.35

McLachlin J. adopted the contextual approach of Wilson J. in writing for a
unanimous Court in Rocket.36 McLachlin J. stated that in undertaking a section 1
analysis, the Court must place the conflicting values in their factual and social
context thus enabling the courts to have regard for the special features of the aspect
of the protected right under scrutiny.37
Similarly, in Thomson Newspapers,38 another freedom of expression case,
Bastarache J., writing for the majority, cemented the centrality of context in section
1 adjudication. The first heading in the section 1 portion of his judgment is entitled
“Contextual Factors” and Bastarache J. states that “The analysis under s. 1 of the
Charter must be undertaken with a close attention to context.”39 Bastarache J.
opined that the emphasis on context “is inevitable as the [Oakes test] requires a
court to establish the objective of the impugned provision, which can only be
accomplished by canvassing the nature of the social problem which it addresses.”40
________________________________________________________________________________
34
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
35
Id., at 1355-56 (per Wilson J.). Although not cited by Wilson J., the origin for the
contextualization of section 1 may arguably be found in the passage in Oakes stating that “Although the
nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be
required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups” (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 103, at 139).
36
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232.
37
See id., at 246-47. In Rocket, freedom of expression under section 2(b) was the particular right
being considered by the Court under section 1.
38
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.
39
Id., at 939.
40
Id.
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Bastarache J. continued, asserting that the proportionality could only be evaluated
through a close attention to detail and factual setting, stating that:
In essence, context is the indispensable handmaiden to the proper characterization of
the objective of the impugned provision, to determining whether that objective is
justified, and to weighing whether the means used are sufficiently closely related to the
valid objective so as to justify an infringement of a Charter right.41

The problem with the Supreme Court‟s increasing reliance on “context” is that it
essentially reduces adjudication to a highly subjective exercise with little
predictability. The Oakes test was intended to provide a degree of objective
analysis and predictability; in contrast, extensive emphasis on context undermines
the rule of law. The amorphous concept of “context” makes it increasingly difficult
for lawyers to advise their clients as to how a court will consider a constitutional
challenge.
(b) Other Departures from Universality
In Irwin Toy, the Court indicated its willingness to defer to legislative choice in
a number of circumstances, stating that a more flexible approach to justification
under section 1 should be applied in such cases.42 The Court explained that:
… in matching means to ends and asking whether rights or freedoms are impaired as
little as possible, a legislature mediating between the claims of competing groups will be
forced to strike a balance without the benefit of absolute certainty concerning how that
balance is best struck. Vulnerable groups will claim the need for protection by the
government whereas other groups and individuals will assert that the government should
not intrude.43

The Court further reasoned that this legislative exercise often would require “an
assessment of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified demands on
scarce resources” of which the Court must be mindful.44 These were further
circumstances where a more flexible approach to section 1 justification was
warranted, reasoned the Court.
The Court contrasted the governmental role in mediating between different
groups with the governmental role as the “singular antagonist of the individual.”45
As the Supreme Court defined it in Irwin Toy, the paradigmatic instance of the
________________________________________________________________________________
41
Id.
42
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 993-94.
43
Id., at 993.
44
Id.
45
Id., at 994.
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state as “singular antagonist” against the individual was in the criminal justice
sphere. In such instances, the Court opined that “the courts can assess with some
certainty whether the „least drastic means‟ for achieving the purpose have been
chosen, especially given their accumulated experience in dealing with such
questions.”46 In short, in the criminal justice sphere, the Court will apply the
stringent version of the Oakes test.47
3.

Weakening of Evidentiary Requirements Under Section 1

Generally, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that a limit is
justified under section 1. As set out in Oakes, the standard of proof is the civil
standard of proof by a preponderance of probability. 48 In Oakes itself, Dickson
C.J.C., while stating that evidence would generally be required, opined that “there
may be cases where certain elements of the s. 1 analysis are obvious or selfevident.”49 In the early years after Oakes, there were a number of instances where
the Court was willing to defer to the legislative decisions in the complete absence
of evidence50 or with very little of it.51 From time to time, the Court would express
a willingness to accept recourse to common sense in lieu of evidence under
section 1.52
________________________________________________________________________________
46
Id.
47
It is not clear to us that mediation is any less an aspect of the criminal law. The Court has
arguably recognized this in a number of cases where it applied a more flexible version of the Oakes test
and explicitly recognized the interests of other groups: see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697
(upholding the hate propaganda section of the Criminal Code); R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452
(upholding obscenity provisions of the Criminal Code). Indeed, many sections of the Criminal Code are
aimed at protecting specific groups such as children, married persons, creditors, property owners, etc.
We believe that the legislation of criminal law is fundamentally an exercise in mediation between
different groups in our society.
48
See Oakes, supra, note 35, at 137.
49
Id., at 138.
50
See R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 299-300, 315; Retail, Wholesale & Department Store
Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 590.
51
See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 769-70. This case and those
cited in the previous note have been the subject of criticism. See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada,
looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), at §35.4 and sources cited therein.
52
See e.g., R. v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443, at 448, where McIntyre J., writing for a
plurality, stated that in considering proportionality under the Oakes test, “A certain element of common
sense must dictate.” See also R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at 465 (per Cory J.); Adler v. Ontario,
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, at 720 (per McLachlin J.); and R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at para. 78 (“To
justify the intrusion on free expression, the government must demonstrate, through evidence
supplemented by common sense and inferential reasoning, that the law meets the test set out in R. v.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, and refined in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R.
835, and Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877.”).
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The high-water mark for requiring evidence under section 1 occurred in 1995 in
RJR-MacDonald.53 Despite comments to the contrary,54 McLachlin J., writing for
the majority, imposed a demanding burden of justification on the government. She
criticized the government for failing to adduce evidence to show that less intrusive
regulation would not achieve its goals.55
However, RJR-MacDonald remains an anomaly. Both before and after RJRMacDonald, the Court has shown itself willing to defer to legislative assumptions
so long as they appear to be reasonable.56 Thus, in Butler,57 and recently confirmed
in Little Sisters,58 the Court accepted that Parliament had a “reasoned apprehension
of harm”59 in banning pornography. Furthermore, in Butler the Court stated that it
was reasonable to assume harm in the absence of any hard evidence.60
Similarly, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to make a section 1
determination in the absence of evidence and without the Oakes test. In Stone,61
Bastarache J., writing for a majority, imposed the onus of proving automatism on
the party that raised the issue. Writing in dissent, Binnie J. criticized the majority
for making such a determination because none of the parties or interveners argued
for such a change or brought forth any evidence under section 1 to justify the
limitation on the accused‟s rights.62

IV. CONCLUSION: SHOULD OAKES BE ABANDONED?
In the 15 years that have elapsed since its birth, the Oakes test has become far
more flexible than readers of the original language would have predicted. Perhaps
this result should not be surprising. The Oakes test was created in the early years of
Charter adjudication when the Court was anxious to send a signal that, unlike its
________________________________________________________________________________
53
RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 336-50.
54
Id., at 333 (“Discharge of the civil standard does not require scientific demonstration; the
balance of probabilities may be established by the application of common sense to what is known, even
though what is known may be deficient from a scientific point of view”).
55
Id., at 339. McLachlin J. was also critical of the government for failing to adduce evidence to
show that attributed health warnings would not be as effective as unattributed warnings on tobacco
packaging. This was a clear retreat from the Court‟s so-called “margin of appreciation.”
56
For a review of this position, see Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 38, at 940-43 (per
Bastarache J.).
57
R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 491.
58
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120,
at 1198.
59
Butler, supra, note 57, at 504, and Little Sisters, id., at 1165.
60
It is particularly important to note the Court‟s continued embrace of this doctrine in Little
Sisters where it was confronted with a body of evidence about the salutary effects of gay and lesbian
pornography.
61
R. v. Stone, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 290, at 377-79.
62
Id., at 324-25.
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interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights, it intended to give strong support to
the rights protected by the Charter. The strict test established by Oakes clearly
accomplished that result. However, as it became clear that a strict application of
Oakes would make it difficult to uphold any breach, the Court developed techniques
to dilute the test. Thus, outside of section 2(b), section 1 is being eclipsed by the
development of internal balancing tests. When the section 1 stage is reached, the
Court continues to pay homage to Oakes, but its application is more result-oriented
than principled.
The time has come for the Court to abandon the myth of Oakes‟ universality.
Instead of asserting in each case that Oakes applies and then contextualizing each
application of the test, the Court should begin to construct rights-specific section 1
tests to suit the context of various rights in the Charter. The Court has already
acknowledged that the context of a section 1 inquiry under a section 2(b) claim is
different than under a section 7 claim, etc. The challenge that lies ahead is to
articulate these differences in a rational and comprehensive manner in order to
create section 1 tests that will lend some stability and predictability to Charter
adjudication.
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